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Abstract
We consider the prisoner’s dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network,
where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to
co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players. Individual
decisions are made fully rationally and are based on local information only. They
are made such that links to defecting agents are resolved and that cooperating
agents build up new links. The exact form of the updating scheme is motivated
by profit maximization and not by imitation. If players update their decisions in
a synchronized way the system exhibits oscillatory dynamics: Periods of growing
cooperation (and total linkage) alternate with periods of increasing defection. The
cyclical behavior is reduced and the system stabilizes at significant total cooper-
ation levels when players are less synchronized. In this regime we find emergent
network structures resembling ’complex’ and hierarchical topology. The exponent
of the power-law degree distribution (γ ∼ 8.6) perfectly matches empirical results
of human communication networks.
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1 Introduction
The recent years have seen a drastic increase of interest in understanding the
emergence of complex structures in nature and society. In this context, net-
work theory has played an important role because it provides a topological
substrate of discrete real-world interactions [1,2]. The science of networks ba-
sically follows two main lines of research: On the one hand the formation of
network structures is studied involving predominatly topological parameters
(e.g. preferential attachement [1]). On the other hand, dynamical processes on
networks with fixed topology have been studied, see e.g. [3]. In this context,
also game theoretic models – in particular the prosners’ dilemma – have been
analyzed on distinct network topologies. So far not much work has focused on
the co-evolution of topological and internal degrees of freedom, see however [4]
for a quite general starting point. In the article we want to specifically address
this matter by discussing a model where internal and topological degrees of
freedom mutually influence each other. The model is based on the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) [5] – one of the most impressive ways of illustrating situations
of human interactions where mutual trust is beneficial, but egotism leads to a
breach of promise. The fundamental interest in the PD arises from its applica-
bility in a variety of fields, ranging from physics and biology to economics and
finance [6,7,8]. It is of particular interest in constitutional economics [9,10,11].
The central point in the PD dilemma is the payoff matrix, whose specific form
reads for the payoff of one of two players, say player i,
Pij =


R S
T P

 Pij =


3 −1
4 0

 . (1)
Each player has two options: she can defect (D) or cooperate (C). Mutual
cooperation yields the highest total payoff – giving each of the players an
equal payoff of R (reward); this is the optimal strategy when seen from a
’global’ point of view. If one of the players defects while the other cooperates,
the highest attainable individual payoff – i.e. the temptation, T – goes to the
defector and the cooperator receives the lowest possible payoff, the sucker’s
payoff, S. The cooperator would have been better off if he would have defected,
thus receiving the payoff I. In a one-shot game, the dilemma holds as long
as the entries of the payoff matrix, Eq. (1), satisfy S < I < R < T and
2R > T + S.
Much research has concentrated on spatial aspects of this game, initially in-
troduced in the pioneering work of Nowak & May [12]. In their work, players
are located on a square lattice and play repeatedly (!) with their neigbours.
Cooperation is made possible by the assumption, that every agent imitates his
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neighbours in such a way, that they synchronously choose the actions of the
neighbours who got the highest payoff in the last turn. This specific rule of
evolution leads to non-trivial complex spatio-temporal dynamics. It has been
noted that the model is seriously troubled by the fact that an asynchronous
update of strategies leads to the break-down of cooperation [13].
Carrying the discussion to more complex structures, the intial model of Nowak
& May and slight adaptions thereof have been extensively studied under the
aspect of different interaction topologies, see [14] for a review of recent devel-
opments. In [15] it was shown, that for a variety of dilemmas (including the
PD), heterogenous networks (e.g. scale-free networks) favor the emergence of
cooperation. The role of hierarchical lattices was elaborately discussed in [16].
Interesting aspects of the PD on random graphs have been analyzed in [17];
the role of small world networks was tackled in [18]. Effects of entries in the
payoff matrix and addition of noise have been examined on different types of
two-dimensional lattices [19]. Other topology related topics, such as the role of
an ’influential node’ [20] and optional participation [21] have been examined
as well. In essence, a vast number of possible topologies and formulations has
been studied. However the networks are static and do not dynamically evolve.
It is important to note that internal sanctions (refusal/termination of links)
and positive feedback mechanisms (’preferential’ choice of cooperating agents)
are both directly related to variability of the underlying network and may
play an important role in real-life situations. Few, but promising works have
brought forward research towards this end in the recent years: In [22], players
keep a running average of payoffs obtained from each other player in a sim-
ulated tournament. These averages effectively determine whom to approach
and whom to accept as co-player in the future. The strategies are basically
determined by the ’genetic code’ of the players and altered by crossover and
mutation during the tournament. In [23] it was examined how preferential
partner selection influences the performance of fixed strategies, thus serving
as a starting-point for models in which players can also choose their strategy.
Recently, results where the evolution of strategies is driven by imitation and
coupled with evolution of the interaction network have been presented [24]
(see [25] for a discussion of sociological aspects). Keeping the total number of
links fixed, the authors found that the system may reach a steady state where
agents predominantly cooperate.
In the present paper, we want to study the formulation of the prisoner’s
dilemma including both: network dynamics and choice of actions. Close to the
’original formulation’ of the PD rationality (not imitation) will be the basis of
individual decisions. We also keep information-horizons local, thus basing our
model-dynamics on a quite strict interpretation of the homo oeconomicus. We
show that the dilemma of overall defection can be overcome despite rational-
ity, thus resolving the prisoner’s dilemma: Even within a population of selfish
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agents (who maximize their expected payoffs for the next turn) cooperation
emerges without the necessity of external rules, imitative behaviour or the
introduction of strategies. As no memory of the agents is involved, our model
also remains also temporarily local and incorporates co-evolutionary dynam-
ics which display interesting collective phenomena and nonlinear dynamics.
It is especially intriguing that the resulting cooperation networks show the
same power-law exponents as those found in real communication networks, in
particular in mobilephone-call networks [26].
The paper is structured as follows: The model is presented in Section 2. In
Section 3 results based on a numerical implementation of the model are pre-
sented. The influence of model parameters are discussed as is the structure of
the networks obtained. Finally, a discussion of the main results is provided in
Section 4.
2 The model
We consider a network with a fixed number ofN agents/players with a variable
number L of links between them, where linked agents play the PD-game. By
N˜i(t) we denote the set of li(t) neighbours of agent i on the network at timestep
t. The actions of the agents are encoded in two-dimensional unit-vectors, i.e.
ai(t) = a
c = (1, 0), if agent i cooperates and ai(t) = a
d = (0, 1), if agent i
defects. We assume that agent i has full knowledge about the chosen strategy
aj(t) and the payoff Pj(t) of each of her neighbours j, but no knowledge
about these quantities for all the other players (local information). At each
timestep, agent i performs an update of his action and local neighbourhood
with probability pu. Thus, decisions for chosing neighbours and the actions
are made simultaneously by an average number of Nupdate ≈ puNtot agents.
For pu = 1, the decisions of the agents are fully synchronized, whereas pu < 1
automatically includes the important case of asynchronous updates [13]. Once
chosen for update, agent i performs maximization of her expected payoff in
the next round, i.e. she maximizes
P¯i(t+ 1) =
∑
jǫN˜i(t+1)
ai(t + 1)Pija¯j(t + 1) . (2)
Here, Pij denotes the payoff matrix, Eq. (1), and a¯j(t+1) the expected action of
neighbour j. The preceding action is taken as reasonable expectation value 1 ,
a¯j(t + 1) = aj(t). In Eq. (2), profit-maximization of agent i is performed by
1 This step may be critized as being inductive. However, for pu < 1 player i will
know that his neighbours will keep their strategy on average. Thus our argument is
inductive only for pu = 1.
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adjusting the future action ai(t+1) as well as the future (expected) neighbour-
hood N˜i(t+1). At this point, further substantiation of the network-dynamics
is inevitable. In the following we will specifiy detailed rules concerning the
individual updates N˜(t)→ N˜(t + 1).
First, we assume that agents cancel a link if the payoff with the respective
co-player is smaller than, or equal to zero, i.e. if the link does not pay off . A
unilateral decision for link-cancellation will suffice to break off of a relation-
ship. The maximum number of links agents may cancel in one period is limited
by a model-parameter α; the neighbourhood after cancellation of α links is
depicted by N˜i(t + 1;α). The parameter α models the maximum number of
relations (to defectors) one is willing to quit per timestep, thus describing the
’sanction-potential’ in the system.
As far as the creation of new links is concerned, we conceive that only agents
who have chosen to cooperate have the possibility to establish new links. We
make this assumption for 2 realistic reasons: On the one hand, one could
assume that the players enter commitments about their future strategies (a
typical element of cooperative game theory). Then, their strategies will prac-
tically be known in advance by potential co-players and it is reasonable that
links offered by agents who anounce to defect will not be accepted. On the
other hand, it is tempting to conjecture that a mechanism of ’recommenda-
tion’ governs decisions of acceptance or refusal of new link-proposals: It is only
rational (and we have assumed rationality of the players) that next-to-nearest
neighbours of i will ’poll’ neighbours in common with i to get an idea about
i’s strategy and that they would only accept a link offered by i in case i is
’known’ to cooperate. In this framework it is natural that unilateral decision
to establish a new connection will suffice, i.e. if player i cooperates and de-
cides to link with player j, the link will be accepted with certainty as j has
no reason to refuse (the new link will allow him to pocket in a riskless profit).
Together with the unilateralism in cancellation of links this makes complicated
’matching’ of the agents’ decisions unnecessary. We limit the maximum num-
ber of links which may be established per timestep by the parameter β; thus
we incorporate some constraint on resources which can be spent to establish
new links 2 . The new neighborhood associated to establishment of β links is
depicted by N˜i(t+1; β). In summary, the parameters α and β can also be seen
as ’agility’ or willingness to change partners upon new information.
With the given specification of network-dynamics, we can formulate the maxi-
mization of the payoff, Eq. (2), in the following way: Each of the Nupdate agents
2 In future work, it could be interesting to study the effect of costs by making β
proportional to some measure of payoff.
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calculates the expected payoff in case of cooperation,
P¯ ci (t + 1) =
∑
jǫN˜c
i
(t+1)
aciPijaj(t) =
∑
jǫN˜i(t+1;α)
aciPijaj(t) + P¯
add
i (t + 1; β) (3)
and the expected payoff in case of defection,
P¯ di (t+ 1) =
∑
jǫN˜d
i
(t+1)
adiPijaj(t) =
∑
jǫN˜i(t+1;α)
adiPijaj(t) (4)
and will choose the strategy with the higher payoff (if payoffs are equal the
strategy is chosen at random). N˜ ci (t+ 1) and N˜
d
i (t+ 1) denote the ’expected’
neighbourhoods for the two cases. For cooperation they can be written as
N˜ ci (t+1) = N˜i(t+1;α)∪ N˜i(t+1; β) and for defection as N˜
d
i (t) = N˜i(t+1;α)
(A ∪ B denotes the union of sets A and B).
Now, the missing piece for determining the action in the next timestep is
the estimation of the additional expected payoff P¯ addi (t + 1; β), which can be
acquired due to new links. To do so, each agent performs an evaluation of the
neighborhood only using information about nearest neighbors, as illustrated in
Figure 1: Agent i first evaluates her payoff obtained from the set of neighbours
he and j have in common, denoted by PN˜(i,j). He can then subtract this payoff
from j’s total payoff, Pj(t), to obtain an approximation of the profit j gains
from the neighbours they do not have in common, denoted by Nnon(i,j). Weighting
this estimate with the fraction β/Nnon(i,j) and averaging over all neighbours N˜i(t),
agent i obtains the expected additional payoff he receives when establishing
β random links to next-to-nearest neighbours
P¯ addi (t+ 1; β) =
1
l˜i(t)
∑
jǫN˜i(t)
Θ(Pj(t))
(
Pj(t)− PN˜(i,j)(t)
) β
Nnon(i,j)
, (5)
which completes the model. Regarding the sum in Eq. (5), we found it realistic
to confine the summation over N˜i(t) to a summation over a subset of N˜i(t),
namely to the first-nearest neighbours of i who have a payoff Pj(t) > 0: It
would be barely rational for an agent to build up links for which he knows
that the expected payoff is negative on average. This is also why l˜i(t) denotes
the effective number of neighbours contributing in the sum. Although the
numerical results given in the next section refer to this specific formulation
of the model, dropping the Θ(Pj(t))-term practically gives the same results
(we will discuss the miniscule effect of this term below). We also note, that
Eq. (5) gives the highest possible value only if all next-to-nearest neighbours
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Fig. 1. Illustration for the notation of variables characterizing the neighborhood of
players i and j. The players have two neighbors in common; the corresponding set
is denoted by N˜(i,j). Agent j has N
non
(i,j) neighbors not in common with i which are
potential new coplayers for i. The payoff player i obtains from the set of neighbours
N˜(i,j) is denoted PN˜(i,j) .
cooperate 3 .
After the evaluation of Eqs. (3) and (4) has taken place, the strategies of
the Nupdate agents are updated at the end of each timestep and links are
removed and built up. We have already discussed that there is no need for
a complicated ’matching’-procedure, as dynamics are governed by unilateral
decisions (of course, it will also happen that two players both decide to play
with each other in the next turn). Finally we note, that an agent is randomly
wired with one link into the network if he happens to loose all his links during
time evolution of the system.
3 Results and Discussion
In the following we discuss the model in dependence of the three main pa-
rameters - pu, α and β. As a starting point for our simulations, we generated
random networks [27] of size of N = 103. Our simulations have clearly shown
that the dynamics and the emerging interaction networks do not depend on the
initial configurations: The system converges relatively fast towards its attrac-
tors (repulsors). Simulations have been typically performed for 105 timesteps,
providing accurate statistics. If not stated otherwise, the payoff matrix was
chosen in the specific form given in Eq. (1). We also studied the effect of
changing the entries in Pij which will be discussed below.
3 It is easy to see that, if j does not cooperate, i can adjust for this via calculating
his payoff on N˜(i,j) assuming defection and correcting Pj(t)−PN˜(i,j) for the difference
in the payoff matrix between defection and cooperation.
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Fig. 2. (a) Time-series of the fraction of cooperating agents fc for different values
of the update-probability pu (pu = 1.0, pu = 0.5, pu = 0.1), showing decreasing
regularity. (b) Time-series of the average number of links 〈li〉 per agent for the same
values of the update-probability pu. Clearly, the time average 〈li〉 for pu = 0.1 and
pu = 0.5 is considerably above the case for pu = 1, indicating the stabilisation of
the corresponding network. (c) Comparing the time-series pertaining to pu = 0.6 of
the model to prandu = 1.0 of a ’random’ formulation of the model described in the
text. The inset shows the empirical distribution of both time-series.
3.1 Properties of cooperation time-series
To discuss basic properties of the time-series, Figure 2 depicts the fraction
of cooperating agents (denoted by fc(t) ≡ Nc(t)/N) and the average linkage
〈li(t)〉 = L(t)/N of a particular simulation for α = β = 6 and various values
of pu. For pu = 1, oscillations with a comparably high amplitude are observed.
Also the average linkage oscillates strongly between a minimum of about 4
and a maximum of 13 links per agent. The reason for the cyclical behavior of
the system can be easily understood: In the states corresponding to low fc,
linkage has been reduced to an extent motivating the agents to build up links
again. In configurations with high fc, the majority of agents has collectively
acquired a state of maximum linkage, meaning there is no more motivation to
cooperate in our rational setting. This can be easily understood since agent i
only cooperates as long as the condition
P¯ addi (t+ 1) + l
c
i (t)R + l
d
i (t)S > l
c
i (t)T + l
d
i (t)I (6)
is fulfilled, i.e. as long as the payoff expected from cooperation is larger than
the payoff expected for defection. Here, li(t) = l
c
i (t) + l
d
i (t), where l
c
i (t) de-
notes the number of links to cooperating neighbours and ldi (t) the number of
defecting neighbours. If all neighbours of agent i cooperate (ldi (t) = 0), he will
defect as soon as li(t) > P¯
add
i /(T −R) where P¯
add
i is bound from above by βR.
Therefore, for the parameters chosen here agents in a cooperative neighbor-
hood will only cooperate as long as li(t) < 18. The observed rapidity of the
oscillations becomes clear, when one considers that the agents may build up
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Fig. 3. (a) States fc visited by the dynamics as a function of the update probability
pu. pu is changed in discrete steps. For each pu, 500 consecutive states fc are plotted.
(b) Range 〈fmaxc − f
min
c 〉 of the oscillations as a function of pu, averaged over 500
independent realizations of time-series.
β = 6 links per move and therefore reach lmaxi comparatively fast. By lowering
α and β the amplitudes reduce, as intuitively expected (not shown).
3.2 Dependence on update-probability pu
In reality, agents are not infinitely fast in assessing new information in their
surrounding, as they need time to adopt and employ decisions. It is known
from previous studies [13] that asynchronous update can strongly influence
observed dynamics and level of cooperation. Considering this by lowering pu,
the oscillations in the overall population are increasinlgy damped, indicating
that the network is stabilized in comparison to the pu = 1 case (see Figure
2). In contrast to the rapid update mode at pu = 1, the range of fc exhibits a
reduced span (about 12% of the overall population) and the average number
of links per agent stabilizes at 〈li〉 ≈ 13. Only an average of 0.5% of the agents
have lost all their links at a given timestep (and are then randomly rewired).
Decreasing pu allows for a mean-field approximation of li, denoted 〈li〉
mf , based
on Eq. (6): If the number of cooperating agents does not oscillate too strongly,
the additional payoff averaged over the neighbours can be roughly estimated
to be 〈P addi (t+1)〉 ≈ βRfc. Since for the specific form of payoff matrix chosen
here T − R = I − S = 1 one can simply add lci (t) and l
d
i (t) in Eq. (6) and
obtains 〈li〉
mf ≈ 13 for pu = 0.6 (fc ≈ 0.75). The actual observed average of
〈li〉 ≈ 12 is in agreement with this approximation.
We now investigate the dependence of fc on the chosen update-probability pu
more closely: In Figure 3a we show the dependence of the fc states visited in
dependence on pu. The plot shows 500 realizations of fc (y-axis) for different
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values of pu (taken after discarding the first 10
3 steps for each pu). In Figure
3a, pu is thus changed in discrete steps of ∆pu = 0.0025. One recognizes that
the fc-states are not trivially visited by the system: Although the system is
oscillating strongly and periodically at pu = 1 because of deterministic aspects
in the evolution, all the points within the amplitude of the oscillations are
visited due to the randomness introduced at various points (e.g. randomness
in the chosen next-to-nearest neighbours, randomness in the strategy chosen
if expected payoffs are equal for cooperation and defection, etc.). Slightly
lowering pu reveals interesting effects on the configuration of the limit cycle
(see the inset of Fig. 3a): One recognizes that the limit cycle first comprises
3 main points between which the system ’hops’ (i.e. it changes from the state
with high fc to the state with low fc with one intermediate step and vice versa),
then 4 points and then again 3 points. For some values of puǫ[0.965, 0.995]
certain states between fmaxc and f
min
c are never reached. Between pu = 0.7
and pu = 0.6 the most frequently visited states change from f
max
c and f
min
c
to the average value of fc (the limit cycle vanishes). This is also evident from
plotting fc(t+ 1) against fc(t) in Figure 4. One recognices that decreasing pu
to 0.7 leads to a smaller gap in the attractor; at pu = 0.6 the gap has vanished
(not shown). Further decrease in pu narrows the space filled by the trajectory
of the system (see Figure 4, pu = 0.1). We have also determined the average
of the double amplitude 〈fmaxc − f
min
c 〉 of the oscillations, see Figure 3b. For
each value of pu investigated we simulated various realizations of time-series
of length T = 103 (discarding the first 103 steps) and averaged the obtained
ranges over these realizations. As Figure 3b shows, the range of oscillations
reduces for lower α = β, as expected. As Figure 3b shows, we did not find
that the amplitude follows a simple scaling function along the bifurcation, thus
suggesting that the observed change in dynamics is more complicated than a
simple Hopf-bifurcation.
As far as the overall dependence of the mean of fc on pu is concerned, Figure
5a shows 〈fc〉 for different values of pu. For α = β = 6, the curve exhibits a
maximum at pu ≈ 0.6, which can be intuitively understood as a trade-off effect
between two aspects: On the one hand decreasing synchronization improves
stability and efficiency in the system as the estimates for the future actions of
neighbours become better and overreaction (extreme oscillations) is reduced.
On the other hand, decreasing pu reduces efficiency via reducing the reaction
of agents to the changes of their neighbours’ strategies. Turning towards the
aspect of decreasing α and β, the system is stabilized at a higher value of pu,
as the gray line corresponding to α = β = 4 has its maximum at pu ≈ 0.7.
This can be intuitively understood: As link-dynamics are slowed down for
α = β = 4 agents have to be able to react slightly faster to employ efficient
internal sanctions via cancellation of links. Another intuitive reason lies in the
fact that lowering α = β effectively reduces the amplitude of oscillations. One
would therefore anticipate that the limit cycle vanishes for a higher value of
pu. We also note that these macroscopic dynamics results in a nice aspect:
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Fig. 4. Visualization of ’attractors’ in the space {fc(t), fc(t+1)} for different values
of pu (pu = 0.1, pu = 0.7, pu = 0.8) and α = β = 6.
Fig. 5. (a) Average number of cooperating agents 〈fc〉 as a function of update-prob-
ability pu for α = β = 6 and α = β = 4. (Taking averages of highly correlated
time-series is to a certain extent problematic, which is why the line is drawn broken
in the corresponding regime. To guide the eye, actual values (circles) have been in-
terpolated by a cubic spline.) (b) correlation length λ determined by an exponential
fit to the auto-correlation function of ∆fc(t) as given in Eq. (7). For very small pu
the exponential fit becomes problematic because the process becomes practically
uncorrelated, i.e. the correlation function turns into a Dirac delta function (the
correlation length is not shown for pu < 0.3).
If agents are too eager (too fast, high update probability pu) to optimize
their neighbourhood, the global level of cooperation becomes suboptimal when
compared to slow adaption (’sloppyness’, low pu): If agents optimize their
situation too ’fast’ everybody is worse off on average.
We have further taken a closer look at the correlations in the system via the
auto-correlation function of the first differences of fc(t), given by ∆fc(t) ≡
fc(t)− fc(t− 1). The envelope of the auto-correlation function is fitted to an
exponential with inverse correlation length λ, i.e.
〈∆fc(t+ τ)∆fc(t)〉 ∼ e
−λτ (7)
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for τ > 0. Values of λ for different update-probabilities are summarized in
Figure 5b. As expected, between pu = 1 and pu = 0.8 correlation is very
strong. Lowering pu below 0.8 leads to an decrease in the correlation, where
the exponential fit becomes more and more problematic. We found that for
pu < 0.3, the correlation function resembles the shape of a Dirac delta function
and the exponential fit loses sensibility.
Let us now discuss the important point of how sensitive the results are to
changes in the specific dynamics chosen. Towards this end, we have compared
results of the model in the form presented here with a formulation without
the Θ(pj(t)) term in Eq. (5). This variation only leads to slight changes in the
oscillatory states of the system at high pu (giving a slightly lower 〈fc〉). For
lower pu the difference between the two formulations became negligible (not
shown). A more massive change in the dynamics occurs when reformulating
the model via dropping the specific assumption of locality, i.e. the assump-
tion of building up new links only to next-to-nearest neighbours. To do so,
we implemented a variant in which β new links to a set of random nodes
N˜ rand(t+1; β) in the system are established. The agents now know the strate-
gies of random players in the system and the payoff of additional links is
determined by P¯ add,V 1i (t + 1) =
∑
N˜rand(t+1;β) a
c
iPijaj(t). Figure 2c shows the
respective dynamics of fc(t): For p
rand
u = 1 we recover oscillatory behaviour.
Compared to the pu = 1 case of the initial model we observe a consider-
ably reduced amplitude. This is expected since N˜ randi (t + 1; β) will always
contain defectors, whereas the initial N˜i(t + 1) mainly consists of coopera-
tors (as the next-to-nearest neighbours are typically cooperators since links to
defectors are immediately cancelled). This can be compared to the expected
payoff being reduced via lowering pu in the initial model, which results in
more defecting next-to-nearest neighbours (as sanctions are not applied im-
mediately). Apparently, Figure 2c suggests that these two effects are nearly
analogous when choosing the update-probabilities appropriately. Apart from
the observation that the average level of cooperation in the random variant is
a little bit higher than in the initial model the time-series match quite well (see
the empirical distribution in the inset). Concerning the slightly higher mean
of the random variant we conjecture that this is due to a welfare effect stem-
ming from the elimination of imperfect information and from knowledge about
global topology. Although the ’random variant’ of the model provides a closer
understanding of the model-dynamics, we will continue with the discussion of
the initial model since it is much more realistic.
3.3 Impact of ’agility’ α and β and the influence of payoff matrix elements
To quantitatively describe the influence of the parameters α and β on fc, we
kept both parameters equal and performed simulations for values ranging from
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Fig. 6. (a) Influence of parameters α and β on the ratio of cooperating agents in a
population of 103 players. The two parameters have been kept equal. Simulations
were done for pu = 0.5. (b) Influence of the payoff matrix element R on 〈fc〉, where
T = 1 +R and the other elements remain unchanged.
α = β = 1 to α = β = 7. Results are summarized in Figure 6a, for pu = 0.5
and for the payoff matrix given in Eq. (1). Only for a parametrization of
α = β = 1, the majority of agents is defecting. One recovers very unstable
networks of low average connectivity of approximately 1.3 links per agent
in this case. For higher values of α = β, the system gets initially stabilized
and the increase of fc flattens as α increases. This can be understood as the
parameter α has reached a value, where cooperating agents are able to cancel
virtually all the links they have with defecting agents. In other words, the
internal sanction-potential of the system has reached a maximum.
Clearly, not only the parameters α, β and pu, but also the entries in the payoff
matrix Pij influence the dynamics obtained within the presented model. In
this context, the entry for constellation I (equal to 0 in Eq. (1)) is of fun-
damental importance: When chosen such that defecting agents keep the links
between one and another, a collapse of cooperation in the system is observed.
On the other hand, increasing the values for temptation T and reward R, while
holding their difference T − R constant, increases the average number of co-
operating agents. This is expected as the relative advantage of defectors over
cooperators is reduced. The corresponding interrelation is quantitatively cap-
tured in Figure 6b for two values of pu (pu = 0.5 and pu = 0.1), α = β = 6 and
T = 1+R. Again, we observe a saturation effect similar to the one found when
varying α and β. Additionally, for ’low’ values of R, the update-probability
apparently has comparatively larger influence on 〈fc〉, whereas in the region of
saturation, the increase caused by ’switching’ between pu = 0.1 and pu = 0.5
is decreasing more and more.
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Fig. 7. Degree distributions averaged over time series with T = 105, N = 103,
α = β = 6 for two different values of the update probability pu (0.1 and 0.6). The
tail for pu = 0.6 may be fitted by a power-law P (k) ∼ k
−γ with γ ∼ 8.6.
3.4 Emerging network topology
The networks obtained as snap-shots of the dynamics exhibit interesting prop-
erties, resembling features of real-world networks. We confine ourselves to the
discussion of the two most widely used quantities in the analysis of networks,
the degree distribution and the cluster-coefficient [1,2]. Figure 7 shows the
degree distribution P (k) in a double-logarithmic plot for two values of pu. To
improve the accuracy of the plot, degree distributions of networks at 103 dif-
ferent times have been averaged. The correlation in the time-series has been
taken care of by using time-intervals of inverse correlation length. Figure 7 de-
picts the degree-distribution for the N = 103 case, for pu = 0.1 and pu = 0.6.
For pu = 0.1, the power-law fit shown is slightly inadequate and indicates
a function somewhere between a power-law and an exponential regime. For
pu = 0.6, the double-logarithmic plot indicates that the tail of the distribution
can be expressed as a scaling law P (k) ∼ k−γ with γ ∼ 8.6. This shows that the
network is clearly not random, but possesses self- similar structure. Lowering
pu, the network loses structure and becomes more random. We repeated the
analysis for larger networks (N = 5000) and did not obtain different results.
The cluster coefficient C, defined as the average of all individual cluster coef-
ficients Ci, provides a quantitative measure for cliques (i.e. circles of acquain-
tances in the network in which every member knows every other member) in
the network. The individual cluster coefficient of a node i is defined as
Ci =
2Ei
ki(ki − 1)
, (8)
where Ei are the number of existing edges between i’s neighbours and ki(ki−
1)/2 gives the highest possible value of edges between the neighbours. As
the expected total number of edges in a random graph can be obtained via
l¯tot = p(N(N − 1))/2, one can compare the cluster coefficient obtained from
Fig. 8. (a) Time averages 〈C〉 of the cluster coefficient for different values of pu
and α = β = 6. The insert shows the cluster coefficients of equivalent random
graphs, denoted by 〈Crand〉. 〈Crand〉 is decreasing strongly for pu > 0.7 because the
average number of links in the system is dropping considerably in this regime. (b)
Individual cluster coefficients Ci plotted against individual degree ki for pu = 0.6
and α = β = 6. The insert shows the tail of the corresponding distribution in a
double- logarithmic plot, where the individual Ci’s have been averaged. The slope
of the interpolating line is δ ∼ − 0.4.
given networks to those of equivalent random networks. Figure 8a shows the
average cluster coefficients from simulations at different values of pu, the other
parameters being kept fixed (α = β = 6). For comparison, also the cluster
coefficients of equivalent random graphs are shown (Crand = p = 〈k〉/N).
Obviously, the observed networks exhibit large clustering- coefficients when
compared to those of equivalent random graphs. This is not surprising, as our
mechanism of linkage directly favours the formation of cliques. When taking a
look at the dependence of the cluster-coefficient on pu, a minimum at pu = 0.6
can be identified. Interestingly, this minimum corresponds to the maximum of
the number of cooperating agents in Figure 5a, and to the value of pu where
the degree distribution was best fitted with a power-law.
Plotting the cluster-coefficients Ci of individual agents vs. their degree ki al-
lows for a more sophisticated analysis of network structure. The corresponding
plot is shown in Figure 8b, where each point corresponds to a pair {ki, Ci}.
The points have been sampled from 100 different networks. Based on this data,
we have calculated the mean cluster-coefficient in dependence of the degree of
the nodes, denoted by 〈Ci〉(k). The tail of this distribution is shown in double
logarithmic scale in the inset of Figure 8b. Clearly, there is a non-random
relationship between cluster-coefficient and degree. The underlying networks
exhibit (complex) hierarchical organisation: For small degrees the mean clus-
tering is much higher than for large degrees. We also evaluated the number
of cooperating agents as a function of degree, finding that fc(k) grows with
degree (not shown). This confirms our expectation that the cooperators are
the ones who build up new links and at the same time do not suffer from
loosing ties.
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Finally, Figure 9 shows the average distribution of individual payoffs in the
system for pu = 0.1 and pu = 0.6. Although the maximum of the distribution
is at a higher payoff for pu = 0.1, the average payoff is higher for pu = 0.6 as
the tail of the distribution is ’fatter’ in this case. The inset shows the tails of
the distribution in a semi-logarithmic plot, indicating that the tails are close
to exponential.
3.5 Experimental evidence for cooperation networks
As a proxy for a cooperation network of humans it is reasonable to consider
telephone call networks. It is reasonable to assume that communication be-
tween cooperating individuals will dominate the total number of calls, while
non-cooperating individuals will avoid communication. There exists recent
research on real mobilephone-call networks [26]. In this study, a power-law de-
gree distribution with a characteristic exponent γmobile ∼ 8.4 was found. It is
obvious, that the exponent obtained within our model (γ ∼ 8.6) shows close
resemblance to this value. This suggests that our model captures dynamics
of real-world networks and has some predictive value. We think that the ex-
perimental procedure (temporally clearly limited measurements of networks)
behind the data reported in [26] is much more comparable to the averaging
procedure in our simulations than the procedures behind many other investi-
gations hitherto, which often involve effects of growth.
4 Summary
In this work, we have considered the prisoner’s dilemma being played on dy-
namic networks under the assumptions of rationality and strictly local infor-
mation horizons of the agents. The novelty lies in the fact that links in the
network are treated as a dynamical variable while – at the same time – we
adopted an update-scheme based on profit-maximization and not on imitation.
The network on which the game is played is thus an emergent structure, co-
evolving with the configuration of strategy-space. Within this framework, rea-
sonable assumptions about fully rational individual decisions lead to a model
of network dynamics where defectors are effectively sanctionized in two ways:
By implicitly being affected by link-cancellations and by explicitly not being
able to establish new links as the players minimize potential losses by accept-
ing only ’recommended’ co-players.
We showed that the dynamics implied are non-linear and lead to the emer-
gence of cooperative behaviour even within a framework of rationality. More
precisely, we observed distinct modes in the model: In the case of high synchro-
16
Fig. 9. Average distribution of the individual payoffs for pu = 0.1 (broken line) and
pu = 0.6 (solid line) (α = β = 6). The insert shows the tails of the distribution in a
semi-logarithmic plot.
nization of the agents’ decisions, significant oscillations of global parameters
appear and much resources are wasted in collective movements. We have dis-
cussed the dependence of the system on the control-parameter in this regime.
For low synchronisation of the agents, randomness in the system and delay
of the players reactions reduces cooperation. For regimes in between high
and low synchronization, we showed that the system reaches an optimum,
where network characteristics resemble those of complex networks, exhibiting
clearly non-random properties like power-law degree distribution and hierar-
chical clustering. Towards this end it is especially remarkable that our model
predicts a rather high tail-exponent γ = 8.6 of real world communication
networks (compare with γmobile = 8.4 in [26]).
It is interesting that oscillatory dynamics immanent for high synchronization
have also been found in a spatial formulation of the prisoner’s dilemma where
participation in the game was voluntary [21]. Thus it seems that the cyclical
dominance of the strategies found in [21] can be qualitatively confirmed even
within the picture of (highly) dynamic networks. The fraction of cooperating
agents in our model was found to be bound by rougly f+c ≈ 0.9 from above and
by roughly f−c ≈ 0.4 from below, showing a saturation regarding the studied
parameters towards f+c = 0.9. This is above the level of cooperation found in
the voluntary formulation of the PD [21] and in the initial work of Nowak &
May [12], but below typical fractions found for the PD on variable networks
with imitative behavior of agents [24]. It is not surprising that imitation on
dynamic networks yields higher overall degree of cooperation than rationality
since on fixed structures cooperation is sustainable for imitation but not (or
much less) sustainable for rational settings.
The current work may be extented in various directions: On the one hand, we
expect that introduction of heterogeneity in the payoff matrix and the param-
eters α and β (i.e. that these parameters take different values for the agents)
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could lead to further interesting results. We also conjecture that coupling β
to some measure of payoff (fitness) of the individual agents should introduce
some new, realistic effects.
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